The Arab World is changing, and will change further, maybe at a faster pace than one might think.
The collapse of the four toughest and long-standing autocratic regimes froze the world's mind in disbelief. While demanding democratic change in their countries -Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen -the people there managed to complete their revolutions without the mass bloodshed that was seen in Libya and continues to be shed in Syria.
Two features of what is being called the 'Arab Spring' need to be highlighted. First, that the anger expressed against regimes is often a principled, non-violent anger, in spite of much provocation. Indeed, the anger is largely being accompanied by a sense of social renewal and national cohesion. The second feature is the sheer surprise of much of the world concerning these popular movements. It is as though Arabs were not quite expected to share, so deeply, the aspiration for pluralist democracy.
Let us tackle, first, the Arab aspiration for freedom. The current uprisings are against regimes that, in many cases, have been in power for 30 or 40 years and, during this period, two structural changes occurred: the growth of everyounger populations at a pace that has moved more rapidly than their economies and their concentration in urban areas. As these changes were taking place, the Omnia Taha Security and Human Rights 2012 no.3 Arab people were dominated by autocratic regimes that fostered an increasing sense of hopelessness, a bitter sense of disability: the inability to change anything in their lives, whether politically, economically or culturally. Indeed, they lived under high levels of oppression, socio-economic inequalities, youth unemployment, dismal healthcare, poor education, cultural anxiety, political humiliation and a loss of dignity and self-respect.
Since the early 1990s, these nation states have in turn been subjected to the perverse effects of globalization: creating more inequalities in the distribution of wealth, widening the gap between the rich and the poor; mercilessly destroying all forms of cohesion within societies, breaking them into individual lonely and depressed entities.
Politically, the leaders of the Arab World today include reformist and conservative monarchs and autocratic presidents; the region's states include some that are tribal and others that are failing, some that have yet to discover a unity that transcends ethnic or religious groupings, and others whose politics is distorted by oil wealth or water poverty.
The weight of this combination was such that most Arabs, and foreign observers, became resigned to the idea that any progress was impossible, particularly when the once progressive and revolutionary republican regimes began to try to transform themselves into a 'family business', with power being passed on from father to son like an inheritance.
For the first time, the League of Arab States went beyond legalizing sovereignty to assuming the latent role of legalizing the aspirations of the Arab peoples for freedom, by freezing the participation of the former Libyan regime, then the Syrian regime in the League's organs.
While the Arab League rarely takes decisions against member states, it has taken a leap forward in this matter during 2011 and 2012.
For a long time, the Arab League has been criticized for not paying attention to the people of the region. Today, we can proudly say that we have embraced the Arab Spring. The Arab League is playing a catalyst role in this historic transformation, and is eager to realize the people's aspirations.
The uprisings and revolutions tested the way in which the democratic countries were dealing with the autocratic regimes: they confused stagnation and the status quo with stability, which is why they preferred to cooperate with such rigid regimes in the past.
Cooperation with the Arab regimes concentrated on stability, which was related to numerous interests (countering Iran's ambitions in the region, Israel's security, immigration control and counter-terrorism). In the early stages of the revolutions, our neighbours to the north were more concerned about the role that Islamic movements might play, and about the large waves of refugees and asylum seekers that were to be expected as a result of the conflicts and reduced border controls.
